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Part I 
Theoretical Backgrounds, Methodological 
Considerations 
 2 
Uneven Development, Socio-Spatial Polarization and 
Political Responses 
Ray Hudson 
1. Introduction 
Although the causal mechanisms and processes are specific to different forms of societal 
organization, uneven development is a characteristic common to more advanced forms of 
societal development. Uneven development is therefore integral to the crisis-prone 
development of capitalist economies. From the outset, such economies were and continue to 
be characterized by socio-spatial uneven development and consequent polarization at various 
scales. The combined and uneven character of capitalist development results in both the 
social production of space and growing qualitative as well as quantitative differentiation 
between places within those socio-spatial structures. Growing economic polarization affects 
social conditions, while, in turn, the evolution of the economic development process is 
influenced by these socially produced spatial differences. As a result, national states (and 
now the EU) see it as necessary to seek to limit socio-spatial polarization and keep inequality 
within ‘acceptable’ limits. 
There is a considerable body of theory in political economy and economic geography 
that seeks to explain why capitalist economies are characterized by uneven development and 
socio-spatial polarization and to consider the implications of this for policy and politics. 
Maps of uneven development have been sharply redefined over the last three decades because 
of the tendential move towards neoliberal globalization, the post-1989 political-economic 
changes in and beyond the EU, and the effects of the financial crisis that erupted in 2008 with 
globally uneven effects. For example, prior to 1989 the territories of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) were located within the spatial division of labour imposed on the COMECON 
(Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) bloc. Post-1989, these countries and their 
constituent places were incorporated, at varying speeds, into spatial divisions of labour of 
capitalism, both the emerging global divisions of labour and those of the EU, as national 
states in CEE sought formal trade relations with the EU and/or applied to become members 
of it. In both cases, spatial divisions of labour were being reshaped under the influence of an 
increasingly powerful neoliberalization tendency that gave greater influence to global market 
forces in reshaping geographies of economies. 
As a result of these developments, there have been significant changes in the place of 
the EU in the global economy and in patterns of uneven development within it. While there 
have been hot-spots of growth, typically linked to financial services and banking, much of the 
EU has been blighted by deindustrialization and economic decline. This has resulted in the 
increasing marginalization of both national economies (such as those of Greece and Portugal) 
and cities and regions within the national territories of the more successful economies (not 
least Germany). While post-1989 geopolitical changes and the subsequent enlargement of the 
EU into CEE promised new development and regeneration opportunities for some cities and 
regions there, these promises have often failed to materialize. However, the global economic 
recession triggered by the collapse of parts of the finance and banking sectors in 2008 
ushered in a new era of austerity that affected much of the EU, including some previously 
economically successful places, as EU institutions and national states seemed powerless to 
combat economic decline and burgeoning socio-spatial polarization and inequality. Indeed, 
political responses often exacerbated these problems. Existing forms of representational 
democracy appeared powerless in the face of deepening depression. One consequence of this 
was a resurgence of far-right and neo-Fascist political parties in some EU countries (such as 
France, Greece and the UK). Another was the re-emergence of new forms of politics and 
protest on the streets of major cities such as Athens, London and Madrid. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, I review different approaches to 
understanding spatially uneven development, and argue that Marxian political economy is the 
most promising of these. Then I consider recent changes in the EU and new forms of political 
response to deepening socio-spatial polarization. Finally, I offer a few concluding comments 
on the likely future. 
2. Theorizing capitalist uneven development and socio-
spatial polarization 
Leaving aside those neoclassical approaches that deny the possibilities of uneven 
development by assumption, there is a wide range of non-Marxian approaches that, in various 
ways, seek to account for uneven spatial development and set out the reasons why growth or 
decline becomes a cumulative and self-reinforcing process (see, for example, Myrdal 1957, 
Hirschmann 1958, Krugman 1991). Once trajectories of change have been initially 
established (for reasons that may or may not be explained), these approaches see places 
becoming locked into their respective trajectories of growth or decline. They share this key 
feature in common. Once the initial trajectory emerges, then the future of a place as 
successful or not seems to be already determined. This is essentially – though implicitly – an 
evolutionary perspective on spatial development, in which the past strongly conditions, or 
even rigidly determines, the future. There are certainly many places in which the trajectory of 
change can be described and interpreted in these terms. However, the historical geography of 
capitalist development is also replete with examples that do not fit into this simple dichotomy 
and follow much more complicated trajectories of change. 
Many places in (and beyond) the EU have followed a different trajectory, switching 
from growth to decline, while others have been repositioned from stagnation outside the 
scope of capitalist social relations to become centres of growth. Other places followed a still 
more complicated path. Once centres of capital accumulation and cumulative economic 
growth, they then reached a tipping point and became places of decline, characterized by 
capital flight, devalorization, disinvestment, job loss and rising unemployment. Subsequently, 
to varying degrees, some of them have experienced a degree of economic renewal, based 
upon new inflows of capital. Not all places abandoned by capital experience such a revival, 
however; some remain economically depressed, marginalized and decoupled from the main 
circuits of capital accumulation. Such dramatic reversals from trajectories of growth to 
decline to renewed growth of a qualitatively different type and scale, or from growth and 
prosperity to seemingly permanent marginalization, require a different and more 
sophisticated sort of conceptual and explanatory approach. 
This more powerful explanation is provided by Marxian political economy, 
emphasizing the inner dynamics of the capitalist mode of production – that is, the particular 
combination of social relations and technologies (material and immaterial) that define 
capitalist economies as capitalist – and emphasizing competition among and within the 
structurally defined classes of capital and labour as the driving force of the economy. The 
struggle between capital and labour in the labour market, in the workplace and at the point of 
production is critical in shaping historical geographies of growth and decline. While not the 
only arena of social conflict within capitalism – although many of the others, such as 
ethnicity, race and gender, often relate to the labour market and the workplace – relations 
between capital and labour are fundamental to trajectories of economic growth and decline. 
Similarly, competition between individual capitals is critical in shaping the path of 
accumulation and the fortunes of particular places. Individual companies seek to compete in 
varied ways – via innovative products and production processes, seeking both to create new 
markets for new products and increase market share by reducing the costs of production of 
existing products, for example. 
Of particular relevance in the context of spatially uneven development is that 
companies also compete by seeking out locations that are particularly profitable and thus 
favourable for capitalist production. These can include locations in which existing products 
can be produced more profitably with existing production technologies because of lower 
costs of purchasing labour-power, or because they offer opportunities to increase labour 
productivity and the rate of exploitation of labour, or because they have less stringent 
regulatory regimes governing workplaces or the environment. They can also include locations 
in which new innovative processes can be introduced because they lack any history of 
industrial production, and so potential workers lack knowledge of productivity and workplace 
norms and of how to organize collectively. Or they may be locations in which new products 
can be produced for which strong levels of effective demand can be created. In short, there 
can be diverse reasons as companies pursue strategies or ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ competition, 
respectively, and thereby help shape place-specific trajectories of growth and decline (see 
Hudson 2001). 
Expressed slightly differently, as an integral part of their competitive strategies, 
companies seek both to produce spatial differentiation in conditions of production and to take 
advantage of existing patterns of differentiation in their search for profits. As a corollary, 
processes of socio-spatial differentiation give rise to rents for landowners and those who 
control natural materials needed in economic processes, thereby influencing the sectoral 
distribution of surplus value. In the past, companies would typically explore such options 
within the boundaries of ‘their’ national territories, although from the outset capital has had 
global horizons. More recently, however, especially in recent decades, companies regularly 
and routinely scour the globe for new locations that will enable them to produce more 
profitably and so gain a competitive edge over their rivals. 
This has some very important practical consequences. One of these, as Hadjimichalis 
(1987) emphasized, is that there is a routine transfer of value between places via exchange 
relations within and among companies. A second is that companies routinely devalorize 
capital and disinvest from some places while investing in others. These latter could be other 
successful places, places previously not penetrated by capitalist relations of production, or 
places that have been abandoned by other companies (or national states) as unprofitable 
locations. Choice of location will depend upon product and process, seeking to match the 
characteristics of place with the requirements of particular activities. But processes of both 
investment and disinvestment and devalorization are unavoidably place specific: these 
processes must occur in specific places. 
As a consequence of this place-specificity, places may sequentially experience 
successive waves of investment and disinvestment, expressed as sequences of 
industrialization, deindustrialization and reindustrialization, of economic growth, decline and 
renewed growth, as part of processes of combined and uneven development that are 
structurally inscribed within capitalist development. Alternatively, places may be 
permanently abandoned by capital if it sees no prospect of sufficient profit in them. Again – 
as also emphasized by Myrdal, Hirschman and Krugman – spatially uneven development is 
seen not just as a product of the uneven distribution of natural resources and the influences of 
nature on economic geographies, but as arising out of the constitutive social relations of 
capital. This point is absolutely crucial, not least as it makes clear that the critical question is 
the form that uneven development and socio-spatial differentiation take – the question is how, 
where and when, not whether, this comes about. 
While Marx’s own work contains suggestive comments and hints about spatially 
uneven development at various scales and its significance for capitalist development, he did 
not fully or systematically develop them. Subsequently, others such as Gramsci, Lenin and 
Luxemburg, working in various strands of the Marxian tradition, further developed Marx’s 
insights and the analysis of uneven development at various spatial scales. It was not, 
however, until the 1960s and the work of Ernest Mandel that intranational uneven 
development began to be more systemically integrated into Marxian political economy, 
further elaborating that approach (Mandel 1968). Mandel, influenced by the historical 
geography of Belgium, specifically recognized the centrality of intranational spatially uneven 
development to the accumulation process. He argued that ‘unevenness of development as 
between different parts of a single country’ is an essential precondition for capital 
accumulation, and that its significance had been greatly underestimated in previous Marxian 
analyses. Furthermore, other social scientists – including Nicos Poulantzas (1978) – were 
soon paying increasing attention to issues of spatially uneven development as a part of this 
reinvigoration of Marxian approaches. 
However, the development of Marxian political economy to encompass spatial 
unevenness as a structurally necessary feature of capitalist development owes most to David 
Harvey. In his magisterial account of The Limits to Capital (1982), Harvey located spatially 
uneven development within the context of his ‘third cut’ at crisis theory and the way in which 
capital both produces and uses spatial differentiation as part of its repertoire of tactics to 
offset falling profitability.<xen>1</xen> In so doing, Harvey, importantly, locates spatial 
uneven development as a systemic feature of capitalist economies. Capitalist development 
was thus explicitly conceptualized as necessarily and unavoidably uneven, simultaneously 
producing places of growth alongside those of decline as an integral aspect of the crisis-prone 
process of capital accumulation. Moreover, for Harvey, the significance of spatially uneven 
development to capitalism did not stop there. He saw urbanization and the development of 
major urban complexes as a central and necessary feature of capitalist development, as 
urbanization (with all its manifold effects on consumption and lifestyle) provided an outlet 
for the realization of surplus value produced within the industrial circuit of capital. 
Harvey’s thinking on spatial uneven development and the way in which the dynamic 
of development in places altered over time was further elaborated by Neil Smith. His concept 
of ‘a see-saw theory of uneven development’ sought to grasp the dialectical relations between 
development and underdevelopment in places (Smith 1984). For Smith, as for Harvey, the 
contradictory character of capitalist development results – inevitably and unavoidably – in 
capital eroding the place-specific conditions of profitable production that first attracted it to a 
place. This erosion reaches a tipping point, at which capital decides to shift location. In 
response to rising diseconomies of place and scale, capital abandons these places in search of 
more profitable locations, externalizing the social costs, which are left to be borne by the 
people and places it abandons. The net effect is that, in response to differences in profitability 
and those things that determine it – such as labour market conditions or pollution regulation – 
capital flows into and out of places, in the process generating growth or decline as well as 
helping (un)make places as socio-material ensembles. Thus, his ‘see-saw theory’ represents 
capital’s ongoing attempt to secure what Harvey had earlier conceptualized as a ‘spatial fix’ 
via systematic mobility and a sort of dynamic equilibrium rather than pursuit of fixity and a 
static equilibrium in the economic landscape. Via this theorization, Smith helps uncover the 
rationale for the constant ebb and flow of capital into and out of places that lies at the heart of 
processes of spatially uneven development. As Smith (1984: 149) put it, ‘ [T]his … see-saw 
movement of capital … lies behind the larger uneven development process.’ 
However, Smith’s approach tends to assume that every place will experience this 
sequence of waves of growth and decline, and while it offers powerful insights into the 
experiences of many places, and throws light on the processes that underlie such shifts, the 
trajectories of change of many others do not fit this pattern. As noted above, there is no 
inevitability of capital flowing back into places it previously abandoned, and they can remain 
marginalized and detached from the accumulation process (except, for example, as sources of 
migrant labour to provide labour-power in those places that form the centres of 
accumulation). More generally, and equally problematically, his approach still leaves the 
question of which places experience which sorts of trajectories of growth and decline, at 
which points in time, and why this is so, rather open. Progress on this front was primarily a 
result of Doreen Massey’s seminal work, brought together in Spatial Division of Labour 
(Massey 1984). Massey sought to develop a different and more pro-active conception of 
places. She challenged a view that sees the fate of places as simply the end product of the 
decisions of capital, as layers of investment and disinvestment are sedimented sequentially 
into or stripped out of a place at capital’s behest, with places as little more than passive 
objects resulting from the logic of capital. In contrast, Massey emphasized the need to take 
account of both the natural and socially produced attributes of place in shaping flows of 
capital. She argued that the agency and activities of people in their place, seeking to make 
and defend its economic viability, are critical for understanding which places experienced 
which sorts of growth, decline and revival. 
In short, in her view, the economic success or failure of places was a result of socio-
spatial processes, the interplay between spatially specific attributes and processes and wider 
systemic forces shaping flows of capital. In stressing that people can and do help shape the 
places in which they live and work, she was making both an acute theoretical observation and 
also an important political point. In the context of the decline of many centres of industrial 
production in the 1980s and campaigns to defend places within (and beyond) the EU in the 
face of a neoliberal onslaught (see, for example, Hudson and Sadler 1983, Beynon 1985, as 
well as the next section), this was an important intervention – one that retains its salience in 
the context of post-2008 depression in many parts of the world, including the EU. 
Subsequently Massey was to develop more sophisticated conceptions of ‘places’ and of the 
way in which they became intertwined via processes of combined and uneven development 
(Allen et al. 1998) but these essentially elaborated upon her earlier theoretical insights. As a 
result of this elaboration, however, there are potential points of convergence between the sort 
of explanatory political-economy approach that Massey developed and more recent cultural 
and institutional perspectives as to why some places ‘succeed’ while others ‘fail’, provided – 
and this is a crucial caveat – that these can be connected with more systemic explanations of 
uneven development (Hudson 2001). 
3. The role of the state in managing spatially uneven 
development within national territories: Managing 
tensions and avoiding crises? 
There is a considerable body of theory acknowledging that the conditions necessary for 
capitalist economies to exist must be socially and politically constructed, and that national 
states continue to have a key role in this process. This includes addressing the potential 
problems that arise as a result of spatially uneven development, both at national state level 
and within the boundaries of their national territories – and it is the latter that is the focus of 
attention here. Certainly, there is evidence of considerable variation in the ways that states 
seek to achieve this, for example as registered in the literatures on regulation and varieties of 
capitalism. While there are those who argue that national states no longer have the 
significance that they once had, David Harvey (2013: 153) is surely correct when he argues 
that 
[T]he question of the state, and in particular what kind of state (or non-capitalist 
equivalent), cannot be avoided even in the midst of immense contemporary 
scepticism […] of the viability or desirability of such a form of institutionalization. 
Furthermore, this form of institutionalization and its involvement in responding to problems 
of socio-spatial inequality and polarization within national territories has a clear history. 
Beginning in the UK in the late 1920s, spatially uneven development, initially in the 
form of ‘the regional problem’, emerged onto the political agenda. Around the same time, it 
emerged onto the political agenda in the US – for example with the creation of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority. In these ways and countries, spatially uneven development came to be seen 
as a potential political problem to which, for a variety of reasons, the capitalist state ‘had’ to 
respond.<xen>2</xen> From Marx onwards, however, critical theorists have emphasized that 
capitalist development is inherently crisis prone and that uneven development is integral to it. 
As such, it cannot be abolished within capitalist economies. The best that capitalist states can 
therefore hope to do is keep crisis and its expression in socio-spatial inequality within 
economically manageable limits and socio-spatial polarization within politically and socially 
acceptable limits (Habermas 1976). 
Given that uneven development is integral to capitalism, it is no surprise that uneven 
development and socio-spatial polarization have begun to be seen as posing persistent 
problems for national states: for example in relation to economic performance, social 
cohesion and the political integrity of the national state territory. Certainly, different national 
states have tackled this agenda in differing ways, and with variable success. The failures of 
national states to deal successfully with problems of intranational uneven economic 
development led some to argue that this would more or less automatically lead to regionalist 
and nationalist movements seeking greater autonomy from national states, or even secession 
to a new national state (see, for example, Carney 1980). While there is evidence that 
documents the emergence of regionalist and nationalist movements, it is, as noted below, also 
clear that the circumstances in which uneven development becomes the basis for such 
movements is contingent upon cultural and political factors rather than a simple mechanistic 
response to uneven economic development (see, for example, Nairn 1977, Kofman 1985). 
Nevertheless, although they chronically fail to meet their stated objectives of narrowing 
socio-spatial inequalities, the activities of national states and the social forces that shape them 
can still play a key role in shaping the developmental trajectory of places, and so of the 
accumulation process overall. 
State actions and policies are only one source of influence on the character and 
developmental trajectories of places, however. There are other processes at work, endogenous 
to these places and the people who live in them. Places may develop what Harvey, influenced 
by the work of Raymond Williams (1989), refers to as a ‘structured coherence’, generating a 
sense of place-specific identity and interest shared by diverse social groups and forces, 
expressed via a particular ‘structure of feeling’. Such a structure of feeling and attachment to 
a place can, when linked to spatially uneven economic development, become the trigger for a 
variety of place-specific campaigns, as different alliances of social groups – what Gramsci 
might have referred to as hegemonic blocs – come together to defend or promote a shared 
territorial interest (for example as Basques, Catalans or Corsicans). Thus, class and territory 
can become conjuncturally conjoined in political campaigns and movements (as Mandel 
(1963) had recognized in the 1960s through his seminal analyses of capitalist development of 
Belgium). 
These campaigns can take various forms. Their precise expression is always a 
contingent issue, depending on the specifics of time, place and politics. They might involve 
action to protect existing economic activities or to attract new ones to marginalized places. 
They might involve pressures to reduce income transfers from economically successful to 
less successful places, or, conversely, pressures to increase central state resource allocations 
to economically less successful places. They could involve campaigns that directly challenge 
the authority of the national state, seeking to establish more devolved forms of territorial 
governance giving more powers and resources to places at sub-national scale – or, more 
precisely, to those empowered to speak and act on behalf of these places. More radically, 
demands may extend beyond greater devolution of powers to autonomy and independence, 
challenging the territorial coherence of a national state (as in Corsica or the Basque country 
of Spain). In summary, then, places, as Alain Lipietz (1993) put it, can become active 
subjects that act ‘for themselves’ and exert influence over their economic well-being, 
although such moves may be contested within the place itself as other dimensions of social 
differentiation and division override a shared territorial interest (as in north-east England in 
the early 2000s, for example Hudson 2006). 
In one form or another, then, the political effects of intranational spatially uneven 
development may be to generate place-specific pressures to alter patterns of resource 
allocation via the state and keep aggregate state expenditures within acceptable limits. This 
may involve seeking to restructure the state itself in an attempt to smooth the path of 
economic growth at sub-national scales, and thereby to secure the legitimacy of state action. 
Or it may involve seeking to secure the territorial integrity of the national state and avoid 
potential forms of crisis contingent upon secessionist pressures. This is, to say the least, a 
tricky balancing act – one made more difficult for national states within the EU by the 
emergence of EU institutions as political actors, pursuing their own agendas – as state 
policies must seek to defuse the unavoidable tensions and latent conflicts that arise as a result 
of a place being simultaneously socially produced, with multiple dimensional meanings and 
attachments for a variety of people, and one in which capitals seek to make profits. For much 
of the time, this conflict remains latent, as the tensions remain within tolerable limits. But the 
tendency for erupting into place-specific crisis never disappears; it is always immanent in the 
social relations of capital. This has an important consequence: that for places in a capitalist 
economy their relationship to the ebb and flow of the accumulation of capital is critical to 
their (re)production as places. Just as capital needs people as labour-power, so, too, in a 
capitalist economy do people need capital as a source of wage income. This raises some 
important questions as to how places might develop on a resilient and sustainable non-
capitalist basis (though consideration of them is beyond the scope of this chapter; see Hudson 
2009, Hudson 2010, Hadjimichalis and Hudson 2013). 
4. Socio-spatial polarization, the expansion of the EU 
and political responses to it, before and after the current 
crisis 
As argued above, the character of capitalist development as one of combined and uneven 
development results in the ongoing production and transformation of socio-spatial 
polarization. With successive enlargements of the EU, as well as deepening of the internal 
market, the contours of intra-EU polarization have altered. This was particularly so in the 
wake of the economic and financial crisis that erupted from 2008. This sharply revealed the 
extent to which earlier hopes of EU expansion serving as a means to reduce socio-spatial 
polarization, both within the EU overall and within individual member states, were ill-
founded. 
Initially, entry to the EU had seemingly offered developmental opportunities – of a 
sort – to successive waves of applicant countries, initially the southern European applicants in 
the 1980s and increasingly those from CEE in the 1990s and 2000s. In brief, these 
opportunities were seen to arise from three directions: first, access to the affluent markets of 
the ‘North’ of the EU, although pre-accession trade arrangements had already, to a 
considerable degree, opened such markets; second, new sources of EU grants and loans 
(through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF), 
Cohesion Funds and so on); and third, through new flows of inward investment from the 
more advanced ‘Northern’ parts of the EU and from the USA, Japan and other non-EU 
countries attracted by the magnitude of the EU market. 
It is worth noting, however, that the intra-EU flows had ambivalent effects in relation 
to socio-spatial inequality and polarization. While providing an answer to problems in some 
places, they were often the proximate cause of deepening political-economic problems 
elsewhere as major corporations disinvested from other areas in the EU. These typically were 
areas that had previously suffered the effects of severe deindustrialization and economic 
collapse and had seen inward investment in branch plants as (at least part of) the means of 
creating new economic bases there. In part, however, the changing map of uneven 
development and inequality was also linked to the ‘hollowing out’ of formerly successful 
industrial districts in southern Europe as companies there switched routine production to 
cheaper labour areas in CEE (Hudson 2003). Thus, seeking to address problems in some parts 
of the EU became the proximate cause of amplifying or creating such problems elsewhere, 
transforming rather than ameliorating socio-spatial polarization within it. Post-2008, 
however, many of these new factories in CEE – and, indeed, many other places in the EU – 
either shed labour, cut working hours and wages, or closed completely, not least because 
major corporations relocated production to China and parts of South-east Asia where 
production costs were lower still. 
The common thread linking these successive waves of capitalist investment and 
disinvestment was (and is) capital’s relentless pursuit of profit, relocating to areas with lower 
production costs (of labour-power, land and so on) and/or less restrictive and more 
permissive regulatory regimes. Increasingly, problems of intra-EU uneven spatial economic 
development were shaped by the EU’s changing position in global divisions of labour, with 
increasing socio-spatial polarization between those places that could attract or retain high-
level banking, finance and other professional service functions and those increasingly unable 
to compete in a global marketplace for more routine production and service functions. The 
changing map of socio-spatial polarization was a complex one, however, as those places that 
succeeded in attracting high-level service functions (Frankfurt, London, Paris and so on) were 
typically characterized by sharp intra-urban socio-spatial polarization, polarized labour 
markets and bi-polar income distributions. As a result, there was an increasing juxtaposition 
of wealth and poverty, at varying spatial scales (between and within places), with large 
swathes of the EU blighted by mass unemployment (with the unemployment rate for young 
people reaching 50–60 per cent in Greece and Spain, for example) and the poverty that 
brought with it in an era of shrinking welfare budgets. 
As the EU has expanded and uneven development within it deepened, spatially 
uneven development has increasingly become a political issue for it. The same problems of 
trying to manage uneven economic development that national states in the EU have grappled 
with for several decades have increasingly been faced by the EU as an embryonic 
supranational state and by the political institutions of the Union. As the EU has increasingly 
became a new space of accumulation because of political decisions to deepen and widen the 
Union, especially for those states that entered the Eurozone, so pressures have grown for it to 
be seen to be able to manage the challenges to socio-spatial cohesion that these processes of 
change set in motion. The raft of EU policies (ERDF, ESF, Cohesion Fund and so on) has 
had, at best, partial and temporary success, and sat uneasily with the growing trend towards 
neoliberalization in economic policies more generally. The pressures resulting from 
deepening polarization were further intensified as a result of macroeconomic and fiscal 
policies shaped by the priorities of neoliberalization at both national state and EU levels. 
They reached new heights as the financial crisis that erupted in 2008 spread both spatially 
and sectorally, with the effects felt especially severely in southern Europe, as some national 
states were forced to respond to the crisis by the troika of the EU, European Central Bank 
(ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) with deep austerity policies while some states, 
notably Germany, supported the imposition of austerity policies on others (Hadjimichalis and 
Hudson 2013). 
In this depressed economic environment, the response of the troika and those national 
states that shared its neoliberal agenda was to prioritize the interests of capital in general and 
specific fractions of capital in particular. This class-specific response took a number of forms. 
Perhaps the most revealing of these was the de facto nationalization of banks and major 
insurance companies in the UK and US, the core states of neoliberal orthodoxy. Little more 
than a decade after jettisoning Clause 4 of its constitution (which committed it to public 
ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange), the ‘New Labour’ 
government de facto nationalized two major banks based in the UK: RBS and Lloyds. More 
generally, national governments more or less everywhere cut public sector borrowing and 
public expenditure, especially welfare budgets, and many bailed out banks and financial 
institutions. This turn to austerity politics further deepened inequality and socio-spatial 
divides, with large areas blighted by mass unemployment and poverty (see, for example, 
Jones 2012). In these circumstances, in which it was clear which interests were prioritized by 
conventional representational politics, there was increasing evidence of mass protests on the 
streets of Europe in cities such as Athens, London and Madrid (Hadjimichalis 2013, Harvey 
2013). These were met by the full force of state repression, leading to injuries and deaths 
among those protesting, but leaving questions unanswered as to how to resolve the crisis, 
restore equitable and sustainable growth, and bring the burgeoning maps of socio-spatial 
polarization back into more acceptable bounds. Those questions remain unanswered. Whether 
new forms of politics that can address them can emerge and become dominant likewise 
remains unanswered, but the prognoses are not good. 
5. Through a glass darkly: A glimpse of the future? 
As in the 1980s, when there were strikes and protests on the streets of many places in the EU 
against the destruction of place-based communities as a result of capital flight and national 
state policies, so once again the recent past has seen the reappearance of protest on the streets 
of major cities in the EU as the costs of austerity and tackling the economic crisis have been 
imposed on those least able to cope with them. While there have been numerous place-based 
protests and campaigns, these have not coalesced into more broadly based political 
movements that systemically challenge socio-spatial polarization per se and the dominant 
social relationships and politics that give rise to it. As Williams (1989) emphasized, there are 
genuine difficulties in translating ‘militant particularisms’ and protests that oppose the 
manifestations of uneven development in particular places into more broadly based political 
movements that would contest uneven development and socio-spatial polarization as a 
systemic feature of social structure. Indeed, as exemplified by the rise of the neo-Fascist 
Golden Dawn party in Greece, the political response has often been a regressive right-wing 
xenophobic nationalism rather than any sort of progressive political movement. 
It may be even more difficult to build such progressive campaigns now and in years to 
come. The campaigns that Williams referred to, and those that I have mentioned in the 1970s 
and 1980s, can be thought of as having occurred within the parameters of a struggle defined 
by the two poles of ’s (1944) ‘double movement’, a struggle between marketization and 
social protection in shaping developmental trajectories. The current context is a more 
complicated one, however, further heightening the difficulties of building systemic political 
alternatives to combat inequality and polarization. Building on Polyani’s analysis of the 
‘double movement’, Nancy Fraser (2013a, 2013b) suggests that the emergence of a wide 
range of social movements and struggles that do not fit easily into the twin axes of the double 
movement necessitates a reconceptualization of the terrain of struggle in terms of a ‘triple 
movement’. As well as the Polanyian conception of marketization versus social protection, 
we need to recognize a third focal point of social struggle around emancipation. Rather than 
oscillating along a line between marketization and social protection, political struggle now 
must be seen in terms of contingent movements within a triangle which has marketization, 
social protection and emancipation at its corners. This opens up possibilities of a range of 
connections between these different forces for change which is indeterminate in its outcomes. 
As she puts it (Fraser 2013a: 129), ‘[s]een this way, each term has both a telos of its own and 
a potential for ambivalence which unfolds through its interaction with the other two terms. 
Contra Polyani, therefore, the conflict between marketisation and social protection cannot be 
understood in isolation from emancipation.’ In like fashion, the resolution of tensions 
between emancipation and social protection, and between emancipation and marketization, 
cannot be understood without the influence of the respective third term. When we recognize 
that these conflicts will always be specific in time and place, and recalling Williams’ (1989) 
point about the difficulties of generalizing place-specific militant particularisms, the 
difficulties of building a political alternative that would challenge the systemic processes that 
generate socio-spatial polarization and inequality within the EU look severe in the extreme, 
and the prognosis for a progressive politics to tackle them appears gloomy. 
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<en-group type=“endnotes”> 
<en><label>1</label> 
The ‘first cut’ theory of crisis deals with the underlying source of capitalism’s internal 
contradictions. The ‘second cut’ theory examines temporal dynamics as they are shaped and 
mediated through financial and monetary arrangements. The ‘third cut’ theory seeks to 
integrate spatially uneven development into the theory of crisis. As Harvey (1982: 425) notes, 
‘[t]he task is not easy’. 
</en> 
<en><label>2</label> 
Although, as Costis Hadjimichalis reminded me, around the same time in the USSR, state 
planning, with the creation of successive Five Year Plans, was emerging as a central and 
defining element in the political-economic alternative of Soviet-style communism, which had 
some influence on planning thought and practice in the advanced capitalist world. 
</en> 
</en-group> 
 
